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  For much of the past fifteen years, my assistants and I have been reading minutes and 
papers in the National Archives, the Board of Governors and the New York Federal Reserve 
Bank.  I owe a debt of appreciation to the Board’s librarians; to the archivists at the New York 
bank, to my several assistants, and to many at the Fed who cooperated helpfully to make this 
project come to completion.
1  The result soon will be published in three volumes of more than 
2000 pages.  Volume 1 has been in print for five years. 
  Today, I will discuss some principal findings from volume 2, Federal Reserve history 
from 1951 to 1986.  The starting point is the 1951 Accord with the Treasury that permitted the 
long-term interest rate to rise above 2.5 percent.  The end is the date I chose for the end of the 
Great Inflation. 
  Volume 2 has two main themes.  One is the Great Inflation.  I discuss why it started, why 
it continued for more than fifteen years, why it ended when it did, and why it has not returned, at 
least not yet.  The second theme is the changing meaning of independence. 
  Much of my book is about policy errors and mistaken ideas.  That is what makes the book 
so long.  I let the principals make their arguments repeatedly to make clear that they believed in 
their reasons for acting as they did.  Repetition reinforces my interpretations.  Because I will talk 
about mistakes, let me start by saying a bit about achievements. 
  The United States is the world’s main monetary power.  The Federal Reserve presided 
over the transition from a local or regional system of financial institutions to the current leader of 
the world monetary system.  It managed the transition from the gold standard through several 
alternatives to the present system, or non-system, of floating rates for principal currencies.  It 
managed the transition from a monetary arrangement based on member bank borrowing and the 
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real bills doctrine to the present system based on open market operations supposedly directed at 
the dual mandate.  Traditional central bank secrecy proved incompatible with democratic 
openness, so the Federal Reserve has learned to be more open about its operations and now 
concerns itself with communications policy.  In its 96 years, it has remained free of major 
scandal.  And, from the 1920s on it has done pioneering research on monetary policy and has 
built not one, but many, dedicated and highly qualified research staffs at the Board and several of 
the regional banks. 
  After the mistakes that produced the Great Inflation, the Federal Reserve achieved the 
“great moderation.”  From the mid-1980s to about 2005, the U.S. experienced a long period of 
stable growth, low inflation, and short, mild recessions.  These years are the best in Federal 
Reserve history.  Unfortunately, the System did not continue the policies that achieved its 
greatest success. 
  On the opposite side of the ledger are major and minor mistakes, many of which were 
repeated.  Some members recognized most and perhaps all of the main errors.  The FOMC 
minutes record all the main criticisms that I make followed by my comment saying there was no 
response and no discussion.  Recognition by FOMC members implies that at least some of the 
errors could have been prevented. 
  Reflecting convictions held by many in Congress and in several administrations Federal 
Reserve policy gave greatest attention to avoiding unemployment.  It usually followed a 
lexicographic ordering that gave priority to employment.  After most countries in Western 
Europe restored currency convertibility for current accounts, the conflict between the goals of the 
Employment Act and Bretton Woods became apparent.  The Federal Reserve treated the 
exchange rate as a secondary or tertiary consideration, mainly a problem for the Treasury.  Its 
main error was to diligently pursue an agreement to expand world reserves (the Triffin problem) 
and ignore the more pressing issue of real exchange rate adjustment.  In this, it cooperated with 
the Treasury.  I limit discussion here to domestic policy and operations. 
  Errors such as the failure to urge auctions of Treasury security offerings, or the greater 
weight given to unemployment than to inflation, or the use of four percent as the full 
employment rate long after that rate rose, reflect both error and political pressure.  Economists 
often treat monetary policy as not affected by politics.  Models of optimal monetary policy have 
no role for politics.  Perhaps they take this position because they equate Federal Reserve   3
independence with freedom to take action and follow any chosen path.  Alas, that is rarely true.  
The changing meaning of “independence” is one theme of my history. 
 
Independence 
  History, at least mine, tells a mixed story.  In the postwar years, only part of Paul 
Volcker’s period as Chairman, 1979 to 1984 comes close to the textbook vision of independence.  
In his last years as chairman, the majority of the Board had been appointed by President Reagan.  
They were influenced by James Baker.  On one occasion, the Board voted 4 to 3 for a discount 
rate reduction that Paul Volcker opposed.  And, as Treasury Secretary, Baker chose an exchange 
rate policy that the Federal Reserve had to accept. 
  William McChesney Martin, Jr. defined Federal Reserve independence as “independence 
within the government, not independence of the government.”  His definition recognizes a 
political constraint.  Martin said many times that Congress approves the budget and decides on 
the deficit.  He thought and said the Federal Reserve had to help finance the deficit.  This worked 
reasonably well during the Eisenhower and Kennedy presidencies when the budget was in 
surplus or the deficits relatively small.  It produced high money growth and rising inflation 
during the Johnson presidency, when deficits rose.  Not deficits but Federal Reserve policy of 
financing deficits started and sustained the Great Inflation.  My history gives many other 
examples of political influence on the Fed. 
  When President Nixon appointed Arthur Burns to chair the Federal Reserve, the president 
left no doubt about his view of Federal Reserve independence.  He told Burns and the audience 
that he expected the Federal Reserve to independently decide to do what he wanted done.  
President Nixon promised to reduce inflation without a recession.  His advisers warned him that 
this would not happen.  President Nixon said that no president is defeated for reelection because 
of inflation, only because of unemployment. 
  Burns shared his conviction.  In “The Anguish of Central Banking” (1979) he explained 
that the Federal Reserve should have reduced money growth after 1964.  They couldn’t he said 
because of the political commitment to the welfare state, and the power of labor unions and 
business monopolies.  Burns gave that speech at the 1979 International Monetary Fund meeting 
in Belgrade.  That was the meeting Paul Volcker left early to do what Burns said could not be 
done.   4
  William Miller followed Burns as chairman.  He knew very little about making monetary 
policy.  His main contribution was negotiating an agreement with Congress to end regulation Q 
ceilings. The Carter administration wanted a chairman who was more cooperative than Burns.  
Maintaining independence was not an important concern. 
  The Federal Reserve has much less independence than the European Central Bank (ECB) 
because the government of the European Union has a much smaller role in monetary policy than 
the U.S. administration and Congress.  Congress can change the rules under which the Federal 
Reserve operates, and it proposes to do so frequently.  Federal Reserve officials are very aware 
of this limit on their actions.  Economists cannot understand Federal Reserve policy if they 
ignore political influences. 
  Central bank independence became explicit under the gold standard.  That standard 
constrained monetary policy and inflation expectations.
2  Unrestricted independence allowed the 
Federal Reserve to finance the Great Inflation because Congress at the time gave much greater 
concern to unemployment than to inflation.  I believe Congress should restore independence but 
restrict Federal Reserve actions to a quasi-rule such as the Taylor rule.  If the FOMC decides to 
depart from the quasi-rule, it should offer both an explanation and resignations.  The 
administration can accept the explanation or the resignations.  That would better align 
responsibility and authority. 
 
Some Principal Errors 
  Federal Reserve minutes record major errors.  The Federal Reserve has never agreed on a 
framework for monetary policy.  FOMC minutes or transcripts show many divergent views.  
Most of the policy discussion in 1951-1986 is about near-term actions and in the 1970s and after 
1982 whether to change the nominal federal funds rate or reserves by one-eighth or one-quarter 
of a percentage point.  The real rate is not mentioned.  Most members did not discuss the 
medium- or longer-term consequences of their actions.  The Volcker disinflation is an exception 
that succeeded by concentrating on the medium-term objective of lower inflation. 
  Sherman Maisel recognized the absence of any statement about medium-term 
implications. (Meltzer, 2010, 804) 
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  “First, the FOMC did not have a clear enough picture of the relationship between changes 
in operating variables … and changes in the intermediate monetary variables.  Second, 
there was insufficient understanding of the relationship between changes in the 
intermediate variables and changes in the economy. … Third, there tended to be 
insufficient discussion of developments with respect to the demand for money. … 
Finally, the time period on which the Committee focused in its policy deliberations was 
often too short.  When the Committee set its targets for intermediate variables for only a 
month or two ahead, it was dealing with a period in which current operations could not 
have much effect, and it was not taking into account the longer-run implications of its 
decisions.  (FOMC Minutes, February 14, 1972, 5).” 
  Maisel’s view received little support from most other members and opposition from the 
New York bank.  President Hayes asserted: “It had not been demonstrated that total or 
nonborrowed reserves had any strong or direct effects on the ultimate goals of the economy,” 
(ibid., 21).  His statement seems to deny any link between money and economic activity and 
prices, a strange position for a central banker. 
  Later, the FOMC set a target for some measure of reserves or money growth, but it did 
not permit interest rates to change enough to achieve the target.  I am puzzled by these reported 
failures to achieve a specified target for the aggregates.  The members eventually recognized that 
their decision to limit interest rates changes caused inflation.  Yet, they kept repeating that they 
would not permit more interest rate variability.  Their decision protected the money market from 
variability at the cost of failing to protect the public from inflation.  Eventually, the Volcker 
FOMC stopped short-term interest rate control and claimed that non-borrowed reserves was the 
target.  To avoid blame for the increase in interest rates, the market gained more freedom to 
change short-term interest rates.  At the time, no one believed that rate would rise to 20 percent. 
  The staff usually explained failure to control reserves by claiming that the demand for 
money shifted.  It never admitted that its interest rate target was inconsistent with its reserve 
target.  When challenged occasionally by FOMC members, the staff could not support its 
explanation. 
  A repeated theme claims that the demand for money and monetary velocity are unstable.  
The only truth to this claim comes from over-reliance on quarterly data and concentration on the 
immediate or near-term while ignoring longer-term effects.  Chart 1 plots monetary base velocity   6
(using the Andersen-Rasche St. Louis base) against the corporate bond rate for 78 annual 
observations from 1919 to 1987.  The plot looks the way monetary theory says it should.  There 
is little evidence of the alleged instability that is commonly made by members and staff. 
Chart 1 here 
  I highlighted the years 1925 to 1928 and 1961 to 1969 to illustrate strong evidence of 
stability; when bond rates returned in the 1960s to the same range as in the 1920s, velocity 
returned to that range also.  And after base velocity rose to new heights in the Great Inflation, 
shown by the points at the far right, it returned along the same path during the disinflation.  At 
annual values, the chart shows considerable stability, not the instability claimed repeatedly by 
the Federal Reserve.  The main exception is some years of the Great Depression at the far left of 
the charts.  I conclude base money velocity is a neglected indicator of medium-term policy 
influence and public decisions. 
  Why are my findings about money and velocity so different from Federal Reserve staff 
claims?  The principal reason is that their short-term focus contrasts with my focus on the 
medium-term.  Their neglect of the medium term misleads them about the role and relevance of 
money growth.  For every cyclical downturn from the 1920s through the 1980s, my history 
compares real base growth to the real long-term interest rate using the expected inflation rate 
instead of the actual rate after the expected rate became available.  Charts 2 and 3 show two of 
the comparisons.  In the 1953-54 cycle, real base growth falls until just before the cycle trough in 
May 1954, then it rises.  The real interest rate falls during the decline and rises during the 
recovery, a pro-cyclical movement that misleads.  Real base growth falls again in the months 
before the cyclical peak in August 1957.  Real interest rates fall also.  According to base growth, 
monetary policy tightened.  Real interest rates eased. 
Charts 2 and 3 here 
  Real base growth falls before cyclical troughs and rises before the peaks in every cycle 
from the 1920s to the 1980s.  Real interest rate shows much less consistency.  The Federal 
Reserve never made use of this information at least in part because of its short-term focus and its 
neglect of the importance of money growth. 
  Muth (1960) developed an analysis of permanent and transitory disturbances.  Economic 
life has many disturbances of both kinds.  Some recent examples of permanent changes include 
the end of the Soviet Union, the Russian default, failure of Long-Term Capital, and the decline in   7
housing prices.  Neither Federal Reserve models nor the financial markets recognize that some 
changes persist; they are permanent changes in the environment.  Existing risk models misstate 
risk.
3  This has created large errors at times.  The Federal Reserves’ near-term, short focus 
contributes to this error.  Permanent changes appear in the “fat tails” of distributions. 
  The Kennedy Council of Economic Advisers introduced two major errors.  First, they 
claimed that our market economy generated inflation before it reached full employment.  The 
Council proposed and implemented price and wage guidelines to prevent what it considered 
excessive wage and price increases.  No one explained, or even discussed, how control of a small 
subset of individual prices could prevent persistent changes in the rate of price change.  This 
same error was central to Arthur Burns’ plea for price guidelines and later President Nixon’s 
controls.  The same error re-emerged in the Carter presidency.  No one asked why the money the 
public saved because some prices were controlled would not be spent on something else, or 
discussed why changing a few relative prices could not prevent inflation – the rate of change of a 
broad index. 
  Proponents of guide posts and controls often claimed that corporations and labor unions 
exploited their monopoly power to raise prices.  Burns used this reasoning repeatedly.  He never 
explained why this power resulted in a maintained rate of price increase (inflation) and not a one-
time increase in price level or a change in relative prices that exploited the monopoly power. 
  The confusion of price level, or relative price changes, and inflation – a maintained rate 
of change – was present also in the Federal Reserve’s response to the oil price increases in 1973 
and 1979.  These were large relative price changes.  Reported price index numbers rose for a 
time but returned to their underlying rate of increase if policy remained unchanged.  
Unfortunately, the Federal Reserve, at the time, did not distinguish between inflation and a 
relative price change, so it attempted to reverse the increase.  This added to the social cost.  By 
2008, the Federal Reserve had learned to make the distinction, so it did not repeat the error and it 
began to exclude volatile relative price changes from its measure of “core inflation.” 
  Reliance of the Phillips curve as a model of inflation was the second major problem 
introduced by the Kennedy Council of Economic Advisers.  One error was a belief that policy 
could gain a permanent reduction in the unemployment rate by choosing to accept more 
inflation.  Friedman (1968) pointed out the error.  Another error that persists to the present is the 
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use of the Phillips curve to forecast inflation.  In a series of papers, e.g. Orphanides (2001), 
Orphanides showed that inflation forecasts persistently underestimated the inflation rate.  
Subsequent research established that it was a mistake to rely on available measures of the output 
gap because trend or full employment output varied. 
  Orphanides evidence raises a question.  Why did FOMC members in the 1970s rely on a 
forecast that persistently underestimated inflation?  The answer in my history is that the politics 
of that period especially during the Nixon and Carter presidencies put greatest weight on 
preventing or reducing unemployment.  They worried about inflation, but they mainly acted 
against unemployment.  They used a lexicographic ordering with unemployment most important.  
We seem to be repeating that error now. 
  Policy changed in 1979 and 1980.  When President Carter interviewed Paul Volcker, 
Volcker told him that he would act more forcefully against inflation than his predecessors had 
done.  Carter said, “that’s what I want.”  That was a major change.  Prior to that the Carter 
administration was not known for an effective anti-inflation policy.  It relied mainly on 
guideposts and exhortation.  It changed, I believe, because in 1979 and 1980, opinion polls 
showed that the public considered inflation the most important economic problem.  The public 
wanted to see inflation reduced, and they soon elected Ronald Reagan with a commitment to do 
that. 
  The public had not shown as much concern earlier.  They changed, and the politics of 
controlling inflation changed with them.  Chairmen of the banking committees and other 
members of Congress supported the Federal Reserve’s efforts to reduce inflation.  I believe there 
is an important lesson from this experience.  The only successful effort to disinflate during the 
Great Inflation became possible only when the public opinion polls showed public support. 
  As early as April 1978, Vice-President Mondale sent a note to President Carter to tell him 
that his rating on managing the economy had fallen from 47 percent to 24 percent.  Mondale 
explained the change as a shift in public concern from unemployment to inflation.  Months after 
appointing Volcker, President Carter yielded to Congressional Democrats who urged him to use 
credit controls instead of high interest rates.  The Federal Reserve reluctantly put on mild credit 
controls.  The response demonstrates public concerns.  Although credit cards were not 
controlled, many people cut their cards and mailed them to the Federal Reserve or the president.  
The largest quarterly fall in real GDP followed.  The Federal Reserve ended credit controls in   9
July and increased money growth.  Despite urgings from his staff President Carter did not 
interfere with the inflation control policy again. 
  FOMC minutes show that two relatively successful Federal Reserve chairmen did not 
rely on Phillips curve forecasts.  The Volcker years discussed in chapters 8 and 9 of my history 
contain many statements by Volcker praising the staff but remarking that their inflation forecasts 
were inaccurate and unreliable.  In a television interview in 1980, Volcker was asked about the 
tradeoff between unemployment and inflation.  His reply denied that the main implication of the 
Phillips curve was useful for policy. 
  “My basic philosophy is over time we have no choice but to deal with the inflationary 
situation because over time inflation and the unemployment go together. … Isn’t that the 
lesson of the 1970s?  We sat around [for] years thinking we could play off a choice 
between one or the other … It had some reality when everybody thought prices were 
going to be stable. … The growth situation and the employment situation will be better in 
an atmosphere of monetary stability than they have been in recent years.” [Quoted in 
Meltzer 2010, 1034] 
  Volcker’s major policy change was to shift the weights the Federal Reserve put on 
inflation and unemployment by giving much more weight to reducing inflation.  At first, 
financial markets did not show signs of belief that the change would persist once unemployment 
rose.  Markets recalled that several prior promises to reduce inflation ended after unemployment 
rose.  The Volcker Federal Reserve reduced skepticism by raising the federal funds rate when the 
unemployment rose to eight percent or more in spring 1981.  Expected inflation measures soon 
after declined. 
  Markets remained skeptical during the recovery.  Until 1985, real rates (adjusted for 
expected inflation) remained from 5 to 7 percent.  Investors expected inflation to return.  This 
experience suggests one reason for the long lag between changes in money growth and its 
absorption into prices.  Part of the lag measures the time it takes to convince the public that the 
Federal Reserve will persist. 
  Alan Greenspan also explained that he did not find the staff’s Phillips curve forecasts 
useful.  “The natural rate of unemployment, while unambiguous in a model, and useful for 
historical analyses, has always proved elusive when estimated in real time.  The number was 
continually revised and did not offer a stable platform for inflation forecasting or monetary   10
policy.”  [Quoted in Meltzer 2010, 1034]  The staff continues to rely on Phillips curve forecasts 
and some current members of the Board tell the public that inflation poses little danger when 
unemployment remains high.  They neglect the fact that from 1933 to 1937 broad based price 
indexes rose 12 percent with unemployment rates of 17 percent or higher.  And the wholesale 
price index rose much more. 
  A major cost of the greater emphasis on avoiding unemployment and reducing it when it 
rose was that the public learned that despite the rhetoric about commitment, the Federal Reserve 
would not persist in disinflation policy.  Pressures from the administration, Congress, the 
business community, labor unions and the public ended the commitment and the disinflation 
policy.  Some price indexes fell to zero after a few months of disinflation in 1966.  The Federal 
Reserve came under pressure because housing starts fell, and municipal bond yields and 
unemployment rose.  The Federal Reserve reversed course, and inflation soon after increased. 
  By the early 1970s, many of the public recognized that the Federal Reserve’s efforts to 
disinflate would be abandoned once the unemployment rate rose to 6.5 or 7 percent.  Workers 
accepted short periods of unemployment instead of reducing wage rates.  Producers accepted 
reduced sales instead of reducing prices.  Investors demanded premiums for inflation in long-
term bonds.  The FOMC and others found “stagflation” puzzling.  Arthur Burns and many others 
concluded that the pricing system no longer worked as it had.  For Burns and many others, the 
solution was formal or informal price and wage controls.  After the inflation rate fell to 2 to 3 
percent in the 1980s, the problem called “stagflation” disappeared.  This was an elementary set 
of errors.  It ignored expectations based on observed policies and it failed to distinguish between 
price level changes and maintained rates of price change.  With expected inflation low, many 
wages have fallen sharply during the current recession. 
  In the March 1960 FOMC minutes, Malcolm Bryan, president of the Atlanta bank, urged 
the FOMC to control reserve growth and give more attention to the longer-term consequences of 
monetary actions.  He pointed out that bank reserves did not increase in 1959 and fell in early 
1960. 
  “[O]ur policy, unless greatly ameliorated, will in a matter of time, whether weeks or 
months, produce effects that we do not at all want … [M]onetary policy produces lagged 
effects.  If the effects of an overdone restriction begin sooner or later to be overtly 
evident, and are unfortunate, as I think they will be, we should not be able to plead   11
ignorance. … Let me also suggest, as a sort of aside, that the period we are in is one that 
illustrates the grave dangers of the free-reserve, net-borrowed reserve concept as a guide 
to policy.” (ibid., 20)  (Quoted in Meltzer, 2010, 204) 
  Soon after the economy was in recession.  In the 1970s, Darryl Francis warned about 
money growth frequently.  His warnings, like Bryan’s were ignored.  In the 1970s, some FOMC 
members recognized that inflation was a monetary problem.  They would not control money 
either because disinflation caused a temporary increase in unemployment or, more often, because 
monetary control required larger variation in market interest rates than they were willing to 
accept.  The FOMC seems more concerned with protecting banks from interest rate fluctuations 
than in protecting the public from inflation. 
  Short-term market movements dominated Martin’s concerns and governed his actions.  
He was correct that monetary economics could not predict the daily or weekly market 
movements that concerned him.  But as Bryan and others pointed out at times, inflation would 
not be controlled using his procedures.  Although Martin opposed inflation and made many 
speeches warning about the consequences of sustained inflation, the inflation rate reached 6 
percent in the last year of his service. 
  One of the persistent errors was a consequence of the money market focus.  Free 
reserves—member bank excess reserves minus borrowing—rose when borrowing declined and 
fell when borrowing increased.  The decline in bank borrowing and in loan demand lowered 
other interest rates and money growth.  A rise in bank borrowing had the opposite effect, the 
monetary base, money and interest rates rose. 
  The Federal Reserve interpreted the fall in free reserves and the rise in interest rates as 
contractionary.  Monetarists claimed that the increase in the monetary base and money showed 
that monetary policy was expansive.  This difference in interpretation persisted.  The movements 
of base velocity shown earlier support the monetarist interpretation of events. 
  One consequence was that money growth rose in period of economic expansion and fell 
during economic contractions.  Federal Reserve policy was pro-cyclical.  It prolonged recessions 
and increased inflations.  Monetarists repeated their criticism frequently, but the Federal Reserve 
retained its interpretation. 
  Governor Sherman Maisel pointed out in 1970 that when he became a member of the 
Board, he received hundreds of pages of material.  None explained how the Federal Reserve   12
made decisions.  There was no written record and no agreement among the participants.  More 
surprising to me is that there was never a discussion of the principles guiding monetary policy 
and no effort to agree on a broad framework.  In fact, the Martin FOMC did not use forecasts 
until the mid-1960s.  The “Riefler rule” forbade forecasting. 
  Later, the Board’s staff developed an econometric model and several Reserve banks also 
had models.  FOMC members received forecasts in advance of each meeting, but the minutes 
suggest that members did not rely on or agree to the staff forecast and, as mentioned earlier, Paul 
Volcker and Alan Greenspan did not find the staffs’ forecasts useful. 
  Let me mention a few additional errors that appear frequently.  The minutes rarely 
distinguish between real and nominal exchange rates and real and nominal interest rates.  
Members considered an 8 percent federal funds rate high even as inflation rose to 8 percent.  The 
forecasting staff prepared forecasts without any consideration of monetary policy.  James Pierce, 
a deputy research director pointed that out, but procedures did not change.  The FOMC followed 
an “even keel” policy of holding interest rates unchanged for weeks surrounding a Treasury 
financing.  By the late 1960s, this policy severely restricted the time available for policy 
operations.  Reserves supplied during even keel were not withdrawn, so they contributed to 
inflation.   
  Other errors included: The Federal Reserve was reluctant to urge the Treasury to auction 
securities, so it continued to support bond sales by increasing reserves, and the staff estimated 
the volume of reserves released or absorbed by changes in reserve requirement ratios.  It failed to 
recognize that with interest rates unchanged, total reserves would not change. 
  After Congress passed Resolution 133 and later the Humphrey-Hawkins Act, the FOMC 
issued projections of rates of growth of several monetary aggregates.  Actual growth often 
exceeded the projection.  Instead of adjusting the next projection, the Committee based the next 
projection on the existing level.  Several members, perhaps influenced by a staff study by Bill 
Poole, noted that this procedure gave an inflationary bias to the monetary aggregates, but the 
FOMC did not change. 
 
Brief Summary of 1951-86 Actions 
  In the book, the history of the years 1951-86 covers nearly 1400 pages.  All that I can do 
here is discuss a few highlights.  I concentrate on inflation.   13
  The main monetary policy events of the 1950s were the March 1951 Accord with the 
Treasury that permitted the Federal Reserve to raise the rates on long-term bonds above the 2.5 
percent ceiling established in 1942 to help finance World War II.  As part of the Accord, the 
Federal Reserve agreed to assist the Treasury in financing the debt.  This was the reason for 
even-keel policy.  It became a reason for inflationary policy. 
  The new chairman, William McChesney Martin, Jr. negotiated the agreement for the 
Treasury.  Martin had experience in financial markets.  He was skeptical about the value of 
economics for monetary policy, and he claimed that he did not understand the money supply.  I 
conclude that the reason was the extremely short-run focus on the money market reflected in his 
use of free reserves or color, tone and feel as main indicators.  This usage hid the medium- and 
long-term consequences of his policy until inflation arrived. 
  Nevertheless, Martin maintained relatively low inflation in the 1950s.  A main reason 
was that Presidents Truman and Eisenhower avoided large budget deficits except in recessions.  
President Truman raised tax rates to finance the Korean War, and the Eisenhower administration 
ran budget surpluses in several years.  By 1960, when President Eisenhower left office, the actual 
and expected inflation rate was about zero. 
  The Eisenhower administration began a series of meetings with the Federal Reserve 
chairman that later became known as the Quadriad.  During the Kennedy administration and 
even more forcefully under President Johnson, the administration attempted to restrict Federal 
Reserve independence by promoting “policy coordination.”  Many academic economists favored 
coordination.  In practice, it meant that the Federal Reserve would finance budget deficits.  When 
the time came to reduce the budget deficit, coordination did not work.  Even worse, 
administration economists and the Board staff predicted “fiscal overkill” once the 1968 tax 
surcharge became law.  They urged the FOMC to ease monetary policy.  By year-end Chairman 
Martin knew that he had made a mistake by responding to the pressures for easier monetary 
policy.  Inflation rose.  The inflation problem increased because people expected inflation to 
continue.  Policy actions to end disinflation policy in 1967 and in 1970 when unemployment rose 
strengthened inflation expectations.  Later experience reinforced the belief that inflation had 
lower priority than unemployment. 
  Deficit finance to pay for the Vietnam War and the Great Society and policy coordination 
were main reasons that the Great Inflation started.  They were not the only reasons.  The   14
Kennedy Council of Economic Advisers believed it was socially desirable to increase inflation to 
lower unemployment.  They gave no role to expected inflation.  Instead, they claimed that they 
could use guideposts and guidelines to control price movements.  This argument confused 
control of the level of a few relative prices and some money wages with control of the 
maintained rate of price change.  Proponents never considered why successful control of some 
relative prices would control aggregate spending if money growth remained unchanged. 
  Mentioning the Council of Economic Advisers brings attention to the role taken by 
academic economists.  The dominant view in the academic profession at the time was based on a 
simple Keynesian model such as the model in Ackley (1961).  Economists could change 
outcomes by changing taxes and government spending.  Monetary policy had the task of 
controlling interest rates to permit the economy to realize the full effect of fiscal policy.  
Expectations or crowding out did not appear.  During the 1960s, Ackley was chairman of the 
president’s council. 
  Dissent from these views was heard at the time, but did not influence policy until much 
later.  Arthur Okun, the last chairman of President Johnson’s council, dismissed Milton 
Friedman’s (1968) presidential address as theoretically correct but practically irrelevant.  He 
expected inflation to decline along the same Phillips curve on which it rose.  He recognized later 
that that didn’t happen. 
  The economists on President Nixon’s Council of Economic Advisers accepted 
Friedman’s analysis and believed that excessive money growth was the principal cause of 
inflation.  However, they responded to political pressures to reduce the unemployment rate first 
and reduce inflation later.  Most often, they urged the Federal Reserve to increase money growth. 
  President Kennedy expressed concern about the loss of gold and, at one point, threatened 
to take U.S. troops out of Europe to stop French and German gold purchases.  French President 
deGaulle believed it was an empty threat.  France continued to buy gold from the U.S. stock. 
Germany stopped. 
  The Johnson administration used controls to prevent payments crises from spreading.  By 
1968, only governments and central banks could buy gold from the U.S. stock, and they were 
discouraged from buying.  By the end of Martin’s term in 1970, inflation reached 6 percent and 
the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates was close to its end.     15
  The administration and the Federal Reserve participated in numerous meetings in the 
1960s to create Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).  They gave no attention to exchange rate 
adjustment.  Critics pointed out the mistake; the authorities ignored the criticisms.   
  In February 1970, Arthur Burns replaced Martin as chairman.  Burns had publicly 
criticized the use of guideposts by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations but shortly after 
becoming Federal Reserve chairman, he became a principal advocate.  Burns never clearly 
distinguished price level changes from change in the rate of price change.  He blamed inflation 
on labor unions, monopolies, and the welfare state.  Of course, he heard about money growth 
from his friend, Milton Friedman, but he rejected Friedman’s warnings.  After he left office, he 
recognized that money growth was the principal cause of inflation but he explained that central 
bankers could not reduce money growth because of social pressures from labor unions, 
monopolies, etc. 
  Burns served two terms as chairman.  He wanted reappointment, but the Carter 
administration wanted a more cooperative and congenial chairman.  They chose William Miller.  
Miller negotiated the end of regulation Q.  He did not act effectively against inflation.  After 
about 18 months, he left to become Secretary of the Treasury. 
  Paul Volcker came next.  President Carter appointed a known anti-inflationist.  The 
president had not shown much interest in monetary control earlier, but he seems to have learned 
that guideposts, in any of his administration’s adumbrations, would not control inflation.  With 
election approaching, and the public telling pollsters that the inflation was the country’s main 
economic problem, President Carter responded to Paul Volcker’s statement that he would be 
more active against inflation than his predecessors by telling Volcker, “that’s what I want.” 
  Volcker took office in August 1979.  In September, the Board raised the discount rate on 
a 4 to 3 rate.  Volcker thought the market would interpret the increase as evidence of his 
intentions.  Instead, many read the 4 to 3 vote as a sign of dissension and weakness.  Volcker 
learned that incremental changes were not likely to work. 
  In early October, the FOMC unanimously agreed to control growth of bank reserves.  The 
decision reduced the FOMC’s responsibility for the rise in interest rates. In practice, they 
restricted changes in interest rates at times, but they did not prevent the funds rates from reaching 
20 percent.   16
  Reserve control was imperfect and erratic at times.  Banks borrowed reserves at rates 
often far below the federal funds rate.  Control imperfections may have prolonged the 
disinflationary period.  Three other changes worked to make the anti-inflation policy succeed. 
  First, Volcker got the FOMC to make inflation control its priority.  He reversed the 
lexicographic ordering by putting inflation control first.  Several earlier efforts failed, despite 
strong statements by FOMC members, because the FOMC abandoned anti-inflation actions when 
the unemployment rate rose.  Many believed the same would happen after 1979.  Their beliefs 
received support when the Federal Reserve adopted credit controls and increased money growth 
in the spring of 1980. 
  Second, the Volcker Fed began to change expectations when it raised interest rates in 
April 1981 with the unemployment rate about 8 percent.  Contrary to several Keynesian forecasts 
made during the period, the expected rate of inflation fell quickly.  Within less than 18 months, 
annual rates of inflation fell to 3 or 4 percent.  The unemployment rate rose above 10.5 percent. 
  International and domestic financial failures brought “practical monetarism” to an end.  
Money growth increased and the economy recovered.  Economic research has not given much 
attention to the fact that recovery occurred in 1983 and real growth rose despite real long-term 
interest rates as high as 7 percent.  Real rates remained high for several years.  Markets seem to 
have expected inflation to return in the mid-1980s.  When that didn’t happen, expected inflation 
and long-term rates declined. 
  My book ends with the end of expected inflation.  I chose 1985-86 as that date because, 
at last, money wages, exchange rates, and long-term interest rates had settled at rates that did not 
anticipate a return of high inflation.  Chart 4 shows the decline in money wage growth after 
1981.  By 1984, wage growth reached a non-inflationary rate. This is the start of the period 
described as the “great moderation.”  Money growth and inflation were moderate.  Long 
expansions ended in mild recessions.  Per capita real disposable income increased 50 percent 
from 1986 to 2005.  Complaints shifted from aggregate to distributional results.  Unemployment 
and inflation remained broadly consistent with a Taylor rule. 
Chart 4 here 
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Misperceptions and Mistakes 
  As I noted near the start, most of the errors that I find in Federal Reserve policy are found 
in the minutes.  Members of FOMC urged changes to avoid major problems.  Most comments of 
this kind received no response, and changes did not follow. 
  The models or frameworks used to analyze events made a major contribution to policy 
mistakes.  The simple Keynesian theory in the 1960s replaced the real bills doctrine from the 
1920s and 1930s as a source of error.  Neglect of expectations and efforts to permanently reduce 
the unemployment rate by increasing inflation reinforced the mistakes. 
  The chairmen and members of FOMC did not slavishly follow an economic model.  
Many regarded themselves as practical people, making judgments based on what they saw and 
heard.  This was especially true of Chairman Martin in the 1950s.  He did not find economics 
useful, especially the economics of money. 
  Martin was not alone.  With the exception of the Volcker disinflation, money growth is 
dismissed as irrelevant.  I believe the reason mainly reflects another failing—excessive attention 
to near-term actual or perhaps expected events and the neglect of longer-term implications of 
policy actions.  The minutes that I read through 1986 contain numerous pages discussing 
whether the funds rate should be changed by one-eighth or one-quarter of one percent but 
nothing or almost nothing about longer-term consequences.  Volcker freed the FOMC from this 
type of myopia for only three years.  It returned. 
  Charts 5 and 6 compare market consensus projections of growth and inflation to Federal 
Reserve forecasts and actual growth rates.  The periods shown differ, but for both charts the large 
errors are forecast errors not data revision errors.  One disconcerting finding is the persistent 
large difference between actual inflation and inflation forecasts from 1971 to 1974.  The same 
problem reappears from 1976 to 1979.  The forecasts underestimated inflation almost all the 
time.  Orphanides (1981) showed that inaccurate Phillips curve forecasts were a major reason for 
the error. 
Charts 5 and 6 here 
  Members of FOMC knew about the forecast errors.  Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan 
did not rely on Phillips curve forecasts.  Both chairmen praised the staff but disregarded the 
forecasts, regarding them as inaccurate.  Both recognized that, contrary to the Phillips curve, on 
average inflation and unemployment rates were positively related in the 1970s and 1980s.   18
  Chart 5 suggests that forecast errors for real GDP are often large, often much larger than 
differences between Federal Reserve and market consensus forecasts.  Chart 7 shows forecast 
errors for real GDP growth from 1971 to 1999.  Large errors and persistent errors show how 
difficult it is to forecast quarterly changes. 
Chart 7 here 
  The puzzle is that the Federal Reserve gives so much attention to the near-term and so 
little to longer-term consequences.  They know, as we all should know, that economics is not the 
science that gives accurate near-term forecasts of inflation and output growth.  There is no such 
science.  Further, even if near-term forecasts improved greatly there is good reason to believe 
that policy changes would not have much near-term effect. 
  A related part of the puzzle is that policy can have a predictable effect on medium-term 
inflation.  Several countries have adopted inflation targets that aim at inflation 2 or 3 years 




  Currently, the Federal Reserve faces two major problems.  The government has 
announced that it plans $9 trillion dollars of budget deficits over the next decade.  They do not 
tell us how they propose to finance the deficits or how they might reduce them.  The Federal 
Reserve increased bank reserves by more than $1 trillion, from $800 billion to $2.2 trillion after 
the Lehman failure in 2008.  At the time I write measured excess reserves are $1 trillion.  It is 
disingenuous and wrong to tell the public that most of the problem will be handled by paying 
interest on bank reserves or selling non-marketable securities.  How high do they believe the 
interest rate must rise to get banks to hold hundreds of billions of reserves after loan demand 
increases.  And does the staff model recognize that banks see the lending rate, not the funds rate, 
as the relevant opportunity cost?  To plan for the future, the public should be told how these 
enormous deficits will be financed and how excess reserves will be reduced.  History does not 
record any example of countries that faced high money growth, large and growing budget 
deficits and a depreciating currency that escaped inflation.  The only examples to the contrary are 
countries that adopted strong disinflationary fiscal and monetary policies.  The United States has   19
not begun to make the changes that will be needed.  This is another example of lexicographic 
ordering and a short-term focus. 
  My history shows that the meaning of Federal Reserve independence changed several 
times after 1951.  Paul Volcker restored independence after the Great Inflation.  Much of that 
independence was surrendered in the recent crisis. 
  History suggests that independence and public support of disinflation will be critical in 
reducing reserves to prevent inflation.  During the 1970s the FOMC determined to reduce 
inflation several times.  It did not persist.  As unemployment and interest rates rose, voices in 
Congress, the administration, business, labor, and the public called for lower interest rates, 
higher growth and more employment.  Policy changed. 
  The Volcker disinflation had public support.  Opinion polls showed inflation as the 
public’s most serious problem.  The public elected Ronald Reagan on a program to reduce 
inflation and restore growth.  And leading members of Congress, including chairmen of the 
banking committees, supported a disinflation policy.  Those conditions are not present at current 
and prospective rates of inflation. 
  What should the Federal Reserve do?  They should announce the details of their plan and 
explain the plan and its likely consequences to the Congress and the public. 
  Congress should accept and endorse an independent Federal Reserve, but in return the 
Federal Reserve should accept restrictions on its actions.  Central bank independence began 
under the gold standard.  Central banks received protection from financing the government but 
agreed to abide by gold standard rules.  After the gold standard ended, that restriction no longer 
limited discretion.  One consequence is that the Federal Reserve can increase unemployment and 
inflation.  The public cannot sanction the Federal Reserve.  It blames its political representatives. 
  Back in 1980, I proposed that the Federal Reserve should announce its planned growth 
and inflation targets.  If it misses the target by more than a minor error, it should offer an 
explanation and a resignation.  The president can accept the explanation or the resignation.  That 
closes some of the gap between authority and responsibility. 
  After the New Zealand central bank heard my proposal, they improved on it by choosing 
the inflation target in negotiation with the government.  Many other governments followed.  The 
United States has not.   20
  Another reform requires recognition of the failure to announce a rule for lender-of-last-
resort.  In 96 years, the Federal Reserve has not adopted a rule of this type.  This increases 
uncertainty as comparison of the response to Lehman and AIG shows.  Who knew what would 
happen next?  Also, absence of a rule encourages failing firms to pressure Congress to pressure 
the Federal Reserve.  And, bailouts induce risk taking and moral hazard. 
  The Federal Reserve and Congress should agree on a lender-of-last-resort rule.  
Bagehot’s rule from 19
th century Britain is an excellent starting point.  When the Bank of 
England followed the rule, there were failures, but failures did not end in crisis.  Banks borrowed 
against good collateral. 
  The lender-of-last-resort rule should be part of a reform that includes ending the too big 
to fail policy of the past 30 years.  That policy promotes gigantism, moral hazard, and 
encourages excessive risk.  The policy protects large banks at public expense.  And it distorts 
markets by supporting large banks while letting smaller banks fail.  A correct policy would 
protect the public not the large banks. 
  To implement the policy, Congress should require that, beyond some moderate size, 
banks must increase capital more than in proportion to their increase in asset size.  To prevent 
failures from spreading to counterparties, banks should have a right to borrow from the Fed on 
acceptable collateral.  Gains from economies of scale and scope do not compensate the public for 
losses from bailouts.  And banks that receive aid should be required to repay, as Chile requires. 
  Many critics of economics claim that economists failed to forecast the housing and 
financial crisis.  This criticism assumes that economics is the science that provides accurate 
forecasts.  For fifty years, some of us showed that near-term events can be approximated as a 
random walk. 
  Forecasts can be improved, however.  Muth (1960) showed how to analyze permanent or 
persistent errors.  Few if any financial institutions use Muth’s procedure.  The Board of 
Governors model does not admit persistent shocks, or permanent changes in the environment.  
The Russian default, housing price declines, failure of Long-Term Capital and many other 
persistent changes produced major market disturbances.  We cannot expect to predict permanent 
changes, but we can improve the ability to recognize them when they occur. 
  Finally, I repeat my earlier proposal to increase both price and exchange rate stability.  
We know that no country acting alone can provide both, but both are desirable.  My proposal   21
calls for agreement by the major currency providers – the United States, the European Central 
Bank, Japan and China, if it develops a less restricted monetary system.  The countries would 
agree to maintain inflation between zero and 2 percent.  Any country that fixed its currency to 
the low inflation currencies would import low inflation and maintain a fixed exchange rate.  The 
United States, Japan, and the ECB would benefit from fixed exchange rates and low inflation in 
countries that fix.  Countries that chose to float their currency could do so, but they would lose 
the public benefit.  Real exchange rates would remain flexible. 
 
Conclusion 
  In its 96 year history, the Federal Reserve has adapted to extraordinary changes in 
political and monetary arrangements.  Its record, however, is not without failures and errors. 
  Reforms should be made, to reduce errors.  Discretion should be limited by a rule or 
quasi-rule, preferably one that is compatible with low inflation policies abroad.  Congress and 
the Federal Reserve should agree on a rule for the lender-of-last-resort and follow it. 
  The most important single change in policymaking would change the FOMC’s focus 
from very near-term events to increased attention to longer-term consequences of its actions.  In 
its long history, there are few periods of sustained growth and low inflation.  The years of the 
great moderation are an exception.  At that time, the Federal Reserve acted as if it followed a 
Taylor rule.  More attention to longer-term consequences embedded in a quasi-rule like the 
Taylor rule is a start.  Once the FOMC abandons excessive attention to near-term events, it will 
find that money growth is an imperfect but useful guide on which to rely. 
  Through most of its history, the Federal Reserve followed lexicographic ordering with 
unemployment its principal concern.  When it shifted concern to inflation, unemployment rose.  
Concern shifted back to unemployment.  In 1980-82, disinflation was its main concern.  
Currently, it is back to concentrating on reducing the unemployment rate.  Instead of following 
its dual mandate, it takes one objective at a time.  The result in the 1970s was that both 
unemployment and inflation rose on average.  And in the 1980s both declined. 
  The Feds massive intervention to rescue the large banks and respond to rising 
unemployment is not matched by an effective strategy to prevent inflation.  Although Chairman 
Bernanke told us repeatedly that excess reserves would decline when banks and others repaid 
their short-term debt, it didn’t happen.  Instead the Fed increased mortgage holdings.  These   22
actions introduce large amounts of long-term, illiquid assets onto the Fed’s balance sheet.  
Nothing like this has ever occurred.  It abrogates independence by allocating credit to help the 
housing industry and by mixing credit policy and monetary policy.  Also, it makes it more 
difficult to reduce the massive volume of excess reserves.  Who will buy the massive holding of 
illiquid mortgages? 
  Classical economists understood that when real cash balances rise above the public’s 
desired holdings, the public buys assets and/or output.   When real balances fall below desired 
levels, the public accumulates balances and prices fall until desired real balances are reached.  
The annual demand for base money and money is sufficiently stable to make this classical or 
neo-classical proposition useful, more useful I expect that many of the propositions that are in 
vogue. 
  Most of the economic models used in the academic literature and at the Federal Reserve 
do not include asset prices and credit markets.  One exception that reflects the emphasis on asset 
markets as well as output and prices is in the series of papers that I did with Karl Brunner.
4  This 
work analyzes the interaction of money, debt and capital markets as the process that 
characterizes the credit and money markets.  How can a central bank analyze or regulate banks 
and financial institutions correctly using models limited to output markets in which money has 
no role? 
  Finally, the recurring issue of the role of bank presidents is again active.  In the past 
Congress has not changed their role.  That is the right decision, I believe.  It retains the broad 
influence brought by the presidents, representing regional as well as national interests.  In the 
past, the regional banks have proposed important changes.  St. Louis pressed for the increased 
attention to money, real interest rates and inflation that became System policy from 1979 to 
1982.  Minneapolis has led in the effort to reform the response to bank failures, and all regional 
banks bring information from business, labor and consumers.  And the regional banks are less 
influenced by political pressures.  This valuable role is the heart of President Wilson’s 
compromise that created the Federal Reserve.  The compromise should be retained. 
                                                 
4 Brunner and Meltzer (1993) summarize this work much of which is available also in major journals.   23
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